TITLE VII-BURDEN OF PROOF-EMPLOYEE HAS ULTIMATE BURDEN
OF PROOF IN A TITLE VII CASE TO SHOW DISCRIMINATORY INTENT EVEN IF EMPLOYER'S REASONS FOR DISMISSAL ARE PRETEX-

TUAL-St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,

113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).

Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 to
provide relief to employees who have been harmed by employer
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.2 Title VII was created during a time of serious civil unrest
1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
Title VII provides in pertinent part:
UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

(a) EMPLOYER PRACTICES
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
2 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). In employment discrimination cases, courts follow a three-pronged test first established by the United
States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Alisa
D. Shudofsky, Note, Relative Qualificationsand the PrimaFacie Case in Title VII Litigation,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 553, 554 (1982). See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the McDonnell-Douglastest.
The same three-pronged approach applies to cases involving age discrimination
in employment. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988); Clara B. Burns, Comment, The PrimaFacie Case of Age DiscriminationIn Reduction-In-Force Layoffs: A Flexible Standard, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 841, 842 (1989). The
substantive language of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) parallels
the language of Title VII. Burns, supra, at 846; see also Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003, 1010 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that the operative principles of McDonnell Douglas
are to be applied in age discrimination cases); Hughes v. Black Hills Power & Light
Co., 585 F.2d 918, 919 n.1 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden of
proof allocation to an age discrimination case); Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 585
F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978) (stating that the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas
is controlling in age discrimination cases); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576
F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1978) (establishing the proper burdens in an age discrimination case); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977) (using McDonnell
Douglas to show the burden allocations in an ADEA case), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating that McDonnell Douglasprovides the standards in an ADEA claim and that "[s] ince
the ADEA is patterned after Title VII, the court believes it appropriate to employ the
McDonnell Douglas standards in the present case").
For a comprehensive overview of Title VII and employment discrimination, see
generally CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1988).

NOTE

697

in the United States.' In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, Congress intended to form a national policy of
nondiscrimination.4 Since its creation, Title VII has generated a
substantial amount of litigation in the federal district courts. 5 Be3 See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE XV-XX (1985).
After Rosa Parks refused to move from her bus seat in 1957, Dr. Martin Luther King
led supporters in a peaceful march in Montgomery, Alabama. Id. at xv-xvi. With President Kennedy's election in 1960, civil rights catapulted "into the forefront of national consciousness." HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 4 (1990).
Between 1960 and 1972, major controversies surrounding civil rights erupted in the
United States, including battles over desegregation in schools and public facilities and
voting rights of blacks in the South. Id. at 5. In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King led the
famous march on Birmingham, Alabama, sparking similar protests in dozens of other
cities. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra,at xvii-xix. The United States was going through a
"moral crisis," and PresidentJohn F. Kennedy stated that it was time to act and make a
commitment "to the proposition that race has no place in American life or law." Id. at
xx (quotation omitted). After President Kennedy's assassination in 1963, President
Lyndon B. Johnson pushed forward the civil rights legislation prompted by Kennedy.
JAMES C. HARVEY, BLACK CVIL RIGHTS DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION 6-7
(1973). In 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law, stating that
Americans should "'join in this effort to bring justice and hope to all our peopleand peace to our land.'" Id. at 16-17 (quotation omitted).
4 HARVEY, supra note 3, at 16-19. The other portions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 concerned voting rights (Title I), public accommodations (Title II), public facilities (Tide III), education (Title IV), creation of a civil rights commission (Title V),
federal assistance programs (Title VI), registration and voting statistics (Title VIII),
revision of legal codes (Title IX), creation of the Community Relations Service (Title
X), and a miscellaneous provision creating trial by jury for criminal contempt charges
(Title XI). Id. at 17-19. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the United States Supreme Court
noted: "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
5 See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of
the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 71-91
(1991) (providing a detailed analysis of the different approaches to deciding cases
under Title VII). In fact, there are so many employment discrimination cases in the
federal courts that some proponents of imposing higher standards on the plaintiff
explicitly admit that these higher burdens are motivated in part to decrease the
number of employment discrimination lawsuits in the federal courts. Id. at 69. The
First Circuit claimed that the necessity of proving pretext-plus was "crucial ... in
order 'to insure that [Title VII] does not become a cloak which is nonchalantly
spread across the record' in every instance where one employee (or prospective employee) loses out to a rival of contrary race or gender." Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy,
853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). Similarly, in Palucki v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., the Seventh Circuit proffered that:
The workload crisis of the federal courts, and realization that Title VII is
occasionally or perhaps more than occasionally used by plaintiffs as a
substitute for principles ofjob protection that do not yet exist in American law, have led the courts to take a critical look at efforts to withstand
defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989).
Nearly 88,000 employment discrimination claims were filed with the Equal Em-
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cause it is often difficult for a plaintiff to furnish direct evidence
tending to establish employer discrimination, Title VII litigation
can become quite complex.6
There are two principal kinds of actions predicated on Title
VII.7 In the first kind, a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff alleges that the employer treats some employees less favorably than
others because of the employees' race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.8 In this type of case, the plaintiff must establish that
the employer had a discriminatory intent or motive.9 In the second type of action under Title VII, a disparate impact case, the
plaintiff claims that the employer's actions have a discriminatory
effect on certain protected groups, although those actions may appear to be facially neutral." In these types of cases, the plaintiff
ployment Opportunity Commission in 1993. Leading the News: Charges of DisabilityDiscrimination Boost EEOC Intake by 22% in Fiscal '93, 1994 DAILY LAB. REP. 9, Jan. 13,
1994, at AA-1. This represented "an increase of 21.6% percent from the approximately 72,000 charges filed" in 1992. Id.
6 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983). In Aikens, the Court noted that employees are seldom able to obtain direct
evidence in discrimination cases. Id.; see also Miguel Angel Mendez, Presumptions of
DiscriminatoryMotive in Title VII DisparateTreatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129, 1130
(1980) (noting that employees must often rely on circumstantial evidence to show an
inference of improper motive).
7 SeeJohn F. Smith, III, Employer Defenses in Employment DiscriminationLitigation: A
Reassessment of Burdens of Proofand Substantive StandardsFollowingTexas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372, 372 n.3 (1982) (stating that "[t]he
two principal theories upon which title VII plaintiffs have proceeded are the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories").
8 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(explaining that in disparate treatment cases, " [ t] he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin").
9 Id.; see Mendez, supra note 6, at 1130 (footnote omitted) (stating that in disparate treatment cases, "plaintiffs must somehow show that the defendants' employment
practices, such as firing or refusing to hire the plaintiffs, were prompted by an impermissible discriminatory motive").
10 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. Teamsters summarized the disparate impact theory. SULIVAN, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 140. Under the disparate impact theory, an
employee does not have to prove discriminatory intent. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336
n.15.
Scholars have debated both the legitimacy and the efficiency of disparate impact
theory. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 143. Specific legislation prohibiting disparate
impact discrimination did not exist until 1991, although Griggs held disparate impact
an actionable claim in 1971. The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 144, 350 n.66 (1993) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) (Supp. III 1992); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)); see alsoPamela
L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination,59 FoRDHAM L. REv. 523, 527
(1991) (discussing disparate impact theory prior to the enactment of the aforementioned legislation).
In response to a 1989 case that narrowed disparate impact analysis, Wards Cove
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attempts to show that seemingly neutral rules, even when applied
objectively, have a significant effect on persons protected under
Title VII."
In accordance with these evidentiary concerns, courts have traditionally given Title VII plaintiffs the benefit of certain presumptions. 12 By shifting the burdens of proof and production, courts
Packing Co. v. Atonio, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, overturning parts
of the Wards Cove decision. SULLrVAN, supra note 2, § 4.1A, at 60 (Supp. 1992). The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, although "codifying the judicially-created 'disparate impact'
cause of action," remained vague in certain aspects. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991
and Less DiscriminatoryAlternatives in DisparateImpact Litigation, 106 HARv. L. Ruv. 1621,
1625 (1993). Specifically, the 1991 Act did not specify "the degree to which defendants must substantiate their business-necessity defense." Id.; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional
Response to JudicialInterpretation,68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 923, 923-28 (1993) (detailing
the history of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its ambiguities).
11 Hannah Arterian Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: DisparateImpact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23
B.C. L. REV. 419, 419 (1982). The difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact can be illustrated with the following hypothetical:
[I]f an employer requires that one have a high school diploma in order
to be hired as a laborer, but uniformly waives the requirement whenever
a white person applies and enforces it when a black person applies, the
company will be vulnerable to a claim of disparate treatment, since it
has manifestly treated blacks differently from the way it has treated
whites, and since a discriminatory intent may be inferred. If the company administers the diploma requirement in an even-handed manner,
the company may nevertheless be guilty of a title VII violation under a
theory of disparate impact if, in the relevant labor market, substantially
fewer blacks than whites possess diplomas and a high school education
is not in fact useful in the laborer position. The diploma requirement
has had an impact, whether or not intended, which adversely affects
black persons and which has not been justified.
Smith, supra note 7, at 372-73 n.3.
12 See Marina C. Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of DiscriminatoryMotive in Title VII
Disparate Treatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM L. REv. 1114, 1114-15 (1988) (explaining that plaintiffs' inability to obtain direct evidence of discriminatory intent
prompted the Supreme Court to provide plaintiffs with "an indirect method of proving intent").
Before Hicks, the employer was presumed to have discriminated against an employee once the employee set forth his or her prima facie case. See Lanctot, supra
note 5, at 62-63. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court stated
that:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the
trier of fact believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent
in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the
plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
A presumption "refers only to a device for allocating the production burden."
FLEMINGJAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.9, at 327 (3d ed.
1985). Both legislatures and courts have created presumptions in certain cases. Id.
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have created considerable confusion.'
The United States
Supreme Court formulated the framework for allocating these burdens of proof and production in 1973, and modified the framework in 1980.14 In the first case, the Court established a test
commonly known as the McDonnell Douglasframework.1 5 In recent
years, the United States courts of appeals have disagreed on how to
implement this framework. 6 The main issue concerns whether to
Often, the benefit of a presumption is given for "reasons of convenience, fairness, and
policy" as well as out of a concern for a party's ability to produce evidence. Id. § 7.9,
at 328. Presumptions operate in the following manner:
If B is presumed from A, then on a showing of A, B must be assumed by
the trier in the absence of evidence of non-B. To put it another way, if
A is shown, then the party who asserts non-B has the production burden
on the issue of B's existence or nonexistence.
Id. § 7.9, at 327; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989)
(citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254) ("Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, an
inference of discrimination arises.").
13 See Mendez, supra note 6, at 1130 (stating that although the Supreme Court has
made an attempt to clarify the burden allocation, confusion still exists); Smith, supra
note 7, at 372 (footnotes omitted) ("Nineteen years after the enactment of title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and despite numerous voyages on the ocean of litigation
which have followed, courts are still trying to decide how to allocate the burdens of
production and persuasion in title VII cases.").
In fact, the phrase "burden of proof" is somewhat ambiguous. MCCORMICK ON

EVIDENCE § 336, at 425 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). Policy considerations
govern the allocation of burdens. Id. § 337, at 431. The burden of proof describes
two different concepts: the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 2486-2487,
at 287-99 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1981). A party meets his or her burden of producing evidence when the party introduces enough evidence to avoid a ruling against
him or her on the particular issue. Id. § 2487, at 293. In general, "the party who has
the burden of pleading a fact will have the burdens of producing evidence and of
persuading the jury of its existence as well." McCoRMICK, supra, § 336, at 427.
14 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (creating

the standard for burden allocations); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56 (clarifying the McDonnell Douglas scheme).
15 See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for a description of the test established by the United States Supreme Court.
16 See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 71-81 (pretext-only coui-ts) and at 81-91 (pretextplus courts).
Some "pretext-only" cases include: Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d
1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (holding that "a plaintiff mayprevail at
trial if, in addition to establishing a prima facie case, he persuades a reasonable jury
that the reason advanced for his discharge ... was unworthy of credence"); MacDissi
v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Bhaya v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Tye v. Board of Educ., 811
F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806
F.2d 600, 605 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,
1005 (9th Cir. 1985) (same), modified, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986).
Some "pretext-plus" cases include: Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417
(4th Cir. 1991) (holding that employee will not prevail by showing merely that the
articulated reasons were untrue, but must also show discriminatory intent); North v.
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apply the "pretext rule" or the "pretext-plus rule."1 7 Jurisdictions
that apply the pretext rule require a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual, or not the actual
reason for the employment action.1 8 Alternatively, "pretext-plus"
requires that the plaintiff show more than pretext, namely discriminatory intent.1 9
In a recent case, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,2 ° the United
States Supreme Court settled the dispute among the United States
courts of appeals by establishing the framework to follow in em22
ployment discrimination cases. 21 In a five-to-four split decision,
Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens-Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401,
406 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir. 1984)
(same); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (lth Cir. 1983)
(same).
17 See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 65. Pretext is defined as the "[o]stensible reason or
motive assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real reason or motive; false
appearance, pretense." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1990). In a "pretextonly" court, the court will infer discriminatory intent based on the fact that the employer lied about the reasons for the employment action. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 65.
The federal circuits differ greatly on whether the employee must show only that
the employer's reasons were pretextual, or if the employee must ultimately prove discriminatory intent. See id. at 65-66. Whether the plaintiff must show pretext only or
must also show discriminatory intent is significant, as "[m]ost disparate treatment
cases are won or lost on the issue of pretext." Id. at 67 (quoting Hannah A. Furnish,
FormalisticSolutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title V1I, 6 INDuS. REL. L.J. 353, 357-58 (1984)).
The conflict between applying the "pretext rule" or the "pretext-plus rule" arises
mostly in the context of motions for summary judgment. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 67
n.38. Lanctot posited that "summary judgment has become the principal procedural
battleground for employers seeking to avoid discrimination trials." Id.
18 Lanctot, supra note 5, at 65.
19 Id. at 66. A Texas district court first used the term "pretext-plus" in Valdez v.
Church'sFried Chicken, Inc.. 683 F. Supp 596, 631 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (stating that the
issue becomes "whether an indirect showing of pretext alone is sufficient for plaintiff
to prevail . . .or whether plaintiff must make a showing of 'pretext-plus'").
20 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); see generally Victoria A. Cundiff & Ann E. Chaitovitz, St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Lots of Sound and Fury, But What Does It Signify?, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Winter 1993-94, at 147 (analyzing the effect of the Hicks decision and
providing suggestions to employers on how to prevail in the aftermath of Hicks); Raymond Nardo, 'St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks' Burst Bubble in Employment Discrimination, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 (hypothesizing that Hicks made it much more difficult
and costly for an employee to prevail); Jason M. Weinstein, Note, No Harm, No Foul?:
The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Title VII Employment-Discrimination Cases, 62 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 280, 286-87 (1994) (examining the proper standard in a disparate treatment case in light of the Hicks decision).
21 Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, 2750. The courts of appeals in the Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have followed the
pretext-only rule. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 71-75. The courts of appeals in the First,
Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have adhered to the pretext-plus rule. Id. at
81-83. Some typically pretext-only circuits have applied the pretext-plus rule in a few
cases. Id. at 83-86. In some pretext-only circuits, dissents have espoused the pretext-
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the Court held that even if an employee is able to show that the
employer's given reasons for the employment action are pretextual, the employee still carries the ultimate burden of proof to
show that the employer had an intent to discriminate.2 3
Melvin Hicks, a black man, worked at St. Mary's Honor
Center, a halfway house managed by the Missouri Department of
Corrections and Human Resources (MDCHR).24 Until the
MDCHR mandated personnel changes, Hicks was considered a satisfactory employee. 25 With the change in personnel and supervision of MDCHR employees, however, Hicks began receiving
reprimands and was subsequently demoted. 26 Ultimately, St.
27
Mary's Honor Center discharged Hicks.
plus rule. Id. at 86. See supra note 16 for a list of circuit cases espousing either the
pretext-plus or pretext-only rule.
22 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2745. The Court was split with ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas in the majority, and Justices Souter,
White, Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting. Id.
23 Id. at 2749.
24 Id. at 2746.
25 Id. From 1978 to 1984 the plaintiff had a satisfactory employment record.
Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). In 1984, St. Mary's underwent
major personnel and management changes, including replacement of the superintendent, chief of custody, and some of the shift commanders. Id.
26 Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2746. Hicks was involved in three incidents that had an adverse effect on his employment record at St. Mary's. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246-47.
First, a disciplinary board suspended Hicks for five days because of violations of institutional rules occurring during his shift. Id. Specifically, the officer that was supposed to guard the front door was in a break room, so that another officer had to
leave the control post to get the door for someone who was entering. Id. at 1246.
Additionally, lights on the first floor were turned off. Id. Although no one else was
punished for these violations, it was the alleged policy of St. Mary's management "to
discipline only the shift commander for violations which occur during his shift." Id. at
1247. The second incident occurred on March 19, 1984, when the plaintiff authorized the use of a St. Mary's vehicle by one of the officers to return a borrowed car in
between a double shift. Id. The plaintiff failed to log this occurrence, and a disciplinary board recommended his demotion for this infraction. Id. Finally, on March 21,
1984, the plaintiff wrote a letter to Mr. Powell, the chief of custody, informing him of
a brawl between inmates. Id. The plaintiff ordered one of his subordinates to investigate the matter. Id. Nevertheless, the superintendent officially reprimanded the
plaintiff for his failure to investigate the incident. Id.
27 Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1248. On April 19, 1994, when the plaintiff was notified of
the demotion recommended by the disciplinary board, the plaintiff asked if he could
leave for the rest of the day. Id. at 1247. At that time, the chief of custody instructed
Hicks to go to his locker and return his shift commander manual. Id. Hicks refused,
and the pair exchanged angry words. Id. Hicks told his supervisor that he would be
willing to "'step outside.'" Id. Powell informed Hicks that these words could be interpreted as a threat. Id. Powell then sought disciplinary action against Hicks for the
perceived threat. Id. Although the disciplinary board recommended only a three day
suspension, Steve Long, the superintendent, recommended Hicks's dismissal from St.
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Hicks filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the halfway house, alleging that he
had been the victim of racial discrimination and was wrongfully
discharged in violation of Title VII. 2 8 The district court concluded
that although Hicks established that the employer's proffered reasons for demotion and discharge were pretextual, Hicks failed to
carry his ultimate burden of proof in showing discriminatory intent.29 The court held that the plaintiff had to demonstrate that
race was the determinative factor in his dismissal.3 0 Because Hicks
was unable to create this inference of racial discrimination, the
court found that the employer was entitled tojudgment as a matter
31
of law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that if the employee was able to show that the employer's reasons for discharge
were pretextual, the court must find for the employee as a matter
of law.3 2 The court of appeals stated that the standard applied in
the Eighth Circuit mandated that once the employee demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons given
by the employer were not the actual grounds for discharge, no further proof of discrimination was required. 3
Mary's. Id. at 1247-48. St. Mary's terminated Melvin Hicks on June 7, 1984. Id. at
1248.
28 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. Hicks also brought an equal protection action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the halfway house superintendent. Id. Section 1983 provides
in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Whenever § 1983 is implemented as a parallel remedy in a
Title VII case, "the elements of a cause of action are the same under both statutes."
Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984) (quotation omitted). Sometimes,
it is more beneficial for a plaintiff to bring a § 1983 claim than a Title VII claim, as
§ 1983 contains "certain remedial and procedural advantages over Tide VII." SULLIvAN, supra note 2, § 22.1.1, at 501.
29 Hicks, 765 F. Supp. at 1252.
30 Id. at 1251. The district court found that although Hicks's supervisors clearly
wanted him terminated, Hicks could not demonstrate that their reasons were racially
motivated. Id.
31 Id. at 1252.
32 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492, 493 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113
S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
33 Id. at 493. Specifically, the court of appeals reasoned that because the employee
successfully discredited all of the reasons enunciated by the employer, the employer
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari3 4 to address whether the trial court's finding of pretext mandated that the
employee prevail.35 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reversed
the decision of the court of appeals and held that Title VII plaintiffs carry the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory intent,
and a finding that an employer's proffered reasons were pretextual
will not relieve the employee of this burden. 6 Moreover, the Hicks
Court declared that even if the defendant fails to offer any reasons
for the action at issue, the plaintiff is not automatically entitled to
summary judgment." Nonetheless, the Court dictated that once
the defendant has offered some evidence, any presumption in the
plaintiffs favor drops from the case.3
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green39 was the first case to address
the standards of proof applicable in actions alleging Title VII violations.40 In McDonnell Douglas, the employer laid off the plaintiff as
part of a general reduction of the overall work force. 4' Later, the
was not in a better position than it would have been had it remained silent. Id. at 492.
The court explained that once the employee discredits the employer's reasons, it becomes "more likely than not" that the employer based its decision to terminate "on an
impermissible consideration such as race." Id. at 492-93 (quoting Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
34 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 954 (1993).
35 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993).
36 Id. at 2749.
37 Id. at 2748. The Court explained that "[i]f the defendant has failed to sustain its
burden but reasonable minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes the facts of a prima facie case, then a question of fact does remain,
which the trier of fact will be called upon to answer." Id.
38 Id. at 2749. The Court carefully noted, however, that the presumption in the
plaintiffs favor only forced the employer to come forward with a reason for its employment action. Id. The Court stated that the court of appeals erred by concluding
that discrediting the employer's reason for the action compelled judgment in the
plaintiffs favor. Id. Rather, the Court declared, the plaintiff in a Title VII case always
has the ultimate burden of persuasion. Id.
39 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
40 Id. at 793-94; see Shudofsky, supra note 2, at 553-57 (1982) (focusing on the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case). Although McDonnell Douglas was the first case
dealing with the procedural aspects of a disparate treatment case, there was, in fact,
another very significant case involving Title VII prior to this period. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs Court announced the disparate
impact doctrine. Note, supra note 10, at 1623. Griggs involved a claim that an employer's requirement of a high school diploma or passing of an intelligence test disqualified a disproportionate number of black applicants. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26.
The Supreme Court held that the tests discriminated in practice, regardless of
whether discriminatory intent existed on behalf of the employer. Id. at 432. The
Court asserted that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds'
for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id.
41 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
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plaintiff reapplied for the job, but the employer rejected the plaintiff's application, citing his42involvement in civil rights demonstrations against the company.
The McDonnell Douglas Court established a three-part test for
analyzing claims under Title VII. a3 First, the Court determined
that the plaintiff in a Title VII case must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.4 4 Second, the Court explained, the
burden shifts to the employer to furnish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the employee's rejection.4 5 Finally, the Court
42 Id. at 796. The plaintiff, a civil fights activist, publicly demonstrated against the
employer's layoffs, claiming that they were racially motivated. Id. at 794. After these
demonstrations, the plaintiff reapplied for ajob at McDonnell Douglas, responding to
the employer's advertisement forjob openings in the plaintiffs field. Id. at 796. After
McDonnell Douglas refused to rehire him, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that
the company's refusal was based on his race, and therefore contrary to Title VII. Id.
The plaintiff also alleged that McDonnell Douglas's refusal to rehire him because of
his involvement with the civil rights movement was violative of § 704(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which "forbids discrimination against applicants or employees for
attempting to protest or correct allegedly discriminatory conditions of employment."
Id.; seeTitle VII, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988). The Court made no finding
on this basis, instead basing its decision on § 703(a) (1), which prohibits an employer
from discharging or demoting an employee on the basis of race. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 799. Specifically, the Court stated that it could not "agree that the dismissal of respondent's § 703(a) (1) claim was harmless error. It is not clear that the District Court's findings as to respondent's § 704(a) contentions involved the identical
issues raised by his claim under § 703(a)(1)." Id.
43 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
44 Id. at 802. The Court determined that the plaintiff may establish the prima facie
case by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id.
One commentator has stated that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is outdated, and is no longer relevant in Title VII cases, as discrimination today is much
more subtle. Nestor Cruz, Affirmative Action and Pretext: The Casefor Abandoning McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 40 LABOR L.J. 241, 241 (1989). Cruz suggested that the
plaintiff's prima facie case should be changed to: "(a) Plaintiff was very well-qualified
for the position. (b) Plaintiff's protected class was underutilized or underrepresented
in the classification. (c) Plaintiff was not selected." Id. at 242. Cruz advised that this
reformation of the prima facie case would completely eliminate the pretext rule,
which is "the glaring loophole in existing case law." Id. Cruz asserted that proving
pretext "has become an almost insurmountable burden" for most plaintiffs. Id. Cruz
hypothesized that his formulation of the prima facie case would be class-based, yet
"thoroughly grounded on the outstanding qualifications of the plaintiff." Id.
45 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, if the
employer provided no legitimate reason for the employment action, the employee
would prevail as a matter of law. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Thus, if the employer remained silent, the plaintiff won. Id.;
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stated that the employee must be given the opportunity to show by
"competent evidence" that the presumptively valid justifications for
the employer's actions were pretextual.4 6 The McDonnell Douglas
Court held that the employee must be given an opportunity on
remand to show that the reasons proffered by the employer were
47
pretextual.
Five years later, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,48 the
Court considered important questions regarding the proper scope
of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 49 In
Furnco, three black bricklayers alleged that Fumco's hiring practices and policies constituted discrimination in contravention of Title VII.5 At issue in the case, the Court specified, was whether the
plaintiffs established a prima facie case, and if so, whether the com51
pany was able to effectively rebut the plaintiffs' prima facie case.
The FurncoCourt stated that the prima facie case, as enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas, was not meant to be inflexible.5 2 Additionally,
the Court noted that once a prima facie case was shown, discriminatory animus could be inferred, as it was "more likely than not"
see, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 1992) ("If the defendant
fails to offer such a reason, the defendant loses."); Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d
315, 318 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254) (declaring that "[a]n unrebutted prima facie case entitles the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law").
46 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. The Burdine Court noted that this three-part
intermediary framework "serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and
fairly to this ultimate question." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
47 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
48 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
49 Id. at 569.
50 Id. Furnco specialized in rehabilitating blast furnaces, but did not keep a permanent work force of bricklayers. Id. Instead, Furnco hired a superintendent for
each job, who in turn was responsible for hiring employees. Id. at 569-70. In this
case, Furnco hired a superintendent who did not accept job applications on the job
site, but rather hired only people he knew were experienced or those that came
highly recommended. Id. at 570. The employees alleging discrimination claimed
that they tried to gain employment with Furnco at the job site, but were turned away
despite their qualifications. Id.
51 See id. at 569.
52 Id. at 575-76 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
n.13 (1972)). The Furnco Court enunciated that the proper approach to apply in
establishing the prima facie case was the standard created in McDonnell Douglas. Id. at
575. The Court recounted that under the McDonnell Douglas framework, "aTitle VII
plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing actions taken by the employer from
which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than
not that such actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.'"
Id. at 576 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358
(1977)). The Court stated that it was willing to make this presumption based on
common experience, as people do not usually act arbitrarily, without any hidden motive. Id. at 577. The Court found this was especially true in the business setting. Id.
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that the actions were the result of impermissible considerations."
Nonetheless, the Court explained, the employer must also be given
some latitude to show evidence rebutting this presumption.5 4
The Court expounded on the allocations of the burdens and
McDonnell Douglas's three-part analysis in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.55 In Burdine, the employee filed a suit
against her employer alleging that she had been the subject of gender discrimination contrary to Title VII. 5 6 Justice Powell, writing
for a unanimous Court, declared that once the defendant met the
burden of production by giving a nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection, the employee's prima facie case was effectively rebutted." The Court explained that the plaintiff then has
53 Id. at 580. Discriminatory animus is discrimination that is intended or by design. BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 87 (6th ed. 1990).

54 Fumco, 438 U.S. at 580. The FurncoCourt held that the employees were able to
meet their prima facie case by showing that (a) they were members of a minority class;
(b) they did everything they could to apply for employment; (c) they were certainly
qualified for the job; and (d) they were not hired and "the employer continued to
seek persons of similar qualifications." Id. at 576. Nonetheless, the Furnco Court explained that a prima facie showing is not the same as an ultimate finding that the
employer's actions evidenced a "discriminatory refusal to hire under Title VII." Id.
Therefore, the Court remanded the case to give the employer the opportunity to
rebut the prima facie case by offering evidence that its hiring practices were not, in
fact, racially motivated. Id. at 580, 581.
55 450 U.S. 248, 250 (1981); see Crystal L. Jones, Comment, The Impact of Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine on Employment Discrimination,19 Hous.
L. Ruv. 981, 983 (1982) (questioning whether "the employer's burden [has] become
too light to enable the judiciary to eradicate employment discrimination effectively");
Furnish, supra note 11, at 420 (hypothesizing that the Court's "decisions foreshadow
an ultimate merger" of disparate treatment and disparate impact cases); Ellen M.
Athas, Recent Development, Defendant'sBurden of Proofin Title VII Class Action Disparate
Treatment Suits, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 755, 782-83 (1982) (suggesting a more equitable
standard in disparate treatment cases).
56 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 251. The employee alleged that her employer's failure to
promote her, and her subsequent dismissal, were motivated by gender discrimination.
Id. The employee, who had years of experience in her field, applied for a supervisory
position that was ultimately given to a man. Id. at 250, 251. Although the company
eventually rehired her in a new position in a different department, she nonetheless
brought an action under Title VII. Id. at 251.
57 Id. at 255. The Court explained, however, that although the presumption of
intentional discrimination drops from the case, the employee's prima facie case may
still be considered in deciding whether the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual. Id. at 255 n. 10. Justice Powell posited that in some cases, a plaintiff could prove
pretext by establishing a prima facie case and then engaging in effective cross-examination of a defense witness. Id.
The Court articulated that once the defendant carries the burden of production,
the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." Id. at 255. Justice Powell
emphasized that the employer meets the burden by introducing admissible evidence
that would permit a trier of fact to rationally conclude that the employer's decision
was not based solely on discrimination. Id. at 257. The employer's proffered reasons,
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the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the defendant's reasons for rejection were pretextual.5 8 The employee meets this burden, Justice Powell elaborated, by showing that the employer's
reason is untrue or that a discriminatory motivation more likely
prompted the defendant's actions.5 9
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court again redefined the allocation of burdens in a Title VII case in United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens.6 ° Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, asserted that the factual inquiry carried by the
employee is to show that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.6" The Aikens Court pronounced, in line with Burdine,
that it was the trial court's responsibility to decide if the plaintiff
made a successful showing by either proving that the employer's
proffered reasons were untrue or by directly showing that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer.62 Concluding that the
lower court mistakenly focused on the issue of whether the plaintiff
had established a prima facie case rather than on the question of
the Court remarked, do not have to persuade the factfinder that the employment decision was lawful. Id.
58 Id. at 256.
59 Id. The Court resolved, however, that the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of
persuasion. Id. The burden of proving that the employer's explanation was untrue,
Justice Powell reasoned, "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Id. TheJustice
explained that the employee may meet this burden "either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)). The Burdine
Court remanded the case to give the employer an opportunity to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 260.
60 460 U.S. 711,714-16 (1983). See Szteinbok, supra note 12, at 1119 (maintaining
that after Aikens, "considerable confusion surrounds the relation between proof that
the reason is spurious and proof of discriminatory intent"). In Aikens, a black U.S.
postal worker claimed that the Postal Service had violated Title VII because it "had
discriminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in the Washington, D.C.,
Post Office where he had been employed since 1937." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 712-13.
After the employee presented this evidence, the employer claimed that the employee
"was not promoted because he had turned down several lateral transfers that would
have broadened his Postal Office experience." Id. at 715.
61 Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (citation omitted). The Court asserted that once the
employer offers its proof, the presumption that the employer discriminated "'drops
from the case.'" Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10).
62 Id. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). The Court clarified that the "court
must decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes." Id.
Justice Rehnquist noted that although there will not usually be "eyewitness" testimony
in a Title VII case concerning the employer's mental processes, a court should not
"treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact." Id. Moreover,
the Court stated that the "law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's
state of mind." Id. at 716.
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discriminatory intent, the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the employer discriminated against the
plaintiff.6 3
Subsequent to Aikens, the Court altered the McDonnell Douglas
framework to deal with other types of discrimination cases, such as
those involving "mixed-motives."6 4 Despite the Court's attempts to
63 Id. at 717. Justice Rehnquist explained that once the case reached the stage
where the employer gave reasons for the action, whether the employee established
the prima facie case became irrelevant. Id. at 715. The Aikens Court found it "surprising" that the parties in the case were still addressing the issue of whether the employee had established a prima facie case, as the case already had been tried on the
merits. Id. at 713-14.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, authored a concurrence. Id. at 717
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stressed that Aikens reaffirmed the
framework established in McDonnell Douglas. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Moreover, the Justice enunciated that the employer
may meet its ultimate burden by either persuading the factfinder that the employment action was "more likely than not.., motivated by a discriminatory reason" or by
showing "'that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."' Id. at
717-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quotation omitted). Justice Blackmun further
elaborated that "the McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail
when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment decision." Id. at 718 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
64 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989) (addressing the burden allocation in mixed-motive cases); Jean Calhoun Brooks, Note, 25 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 345, 382 (1990) (explaining that the Court finally addressed the more complex mixed-motive framework instead of relying solely on the McDonnell Douglas
formula in Price Waterhouse). A mixed-motive case is one in which the defendant employer has both legitimate and discriminatory explanations for the employment action. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 288; see also Robert S. Whitman, Note, Clearing the
Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to DisparateTreatment Under Title VI, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 863, 863-64 n.7 (1989) (providing several definitions of mixed-motive cases).
In Price Waterhouse, the United States Supreme Court considered a case in which
the plaintiff was able to show that the employer's proffered reasons for the employment action were both legitimate and illegitimate, or "mixed." Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 232. Price Waterhouse was a plurality decision, with Justice Brennan writing for
fourJustices. Id. at 231. Justices White and O'Connor concurred in the judgment of
the Court, but wrote separate opinions. Id. at 258 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261
(O'Connor, J., concurring). There was also a three-Justice dissent. Id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The plurality espoused that once the plaintiff establishes that
gender was a motivating factor in the employment action, the employer must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that "it would have made the same decision in the
absence of discrimination." Id. at 252-53. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's holding that the employer must make this showing by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 237.
The plurality opinion created a new model of proof in mixed-motive cases, still
claiming that it had no effect on the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. at 244-45.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, by contrast, considered the plurality decision to be a
justified departure from the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. at 261-62 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Justice O'Connor asserted that "[w]here an individual disparate
treatment plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an illegitimate
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refine the McDonnell Douglas test, the courts differed on whether to
apply the pretext rule or the pretext-plus rule regarding the employee's ultimate burden.6 5
In Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,6 6 for example, the Sixth
Circuit required the plaintiff to show more than pretext to prevail
in a Title VII action. 67 In Galbraith,a woman alleged that her employer discriminated against her because of her involvement in an
interracial relationship.6" The court of appeals concluded that the
criterion was a substantialfactor in an adverse employment decision, the deterrent
purpose of the statute has clearly been triggered." Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White, also concurring in the judgment, asserted that the employee
should have to demonstrate that "the unlawful motive was a substantialfactor in the
adverse employment action." Id. at 259 (White,J., concurring). Justice White posited
that
there is no special requirement that the employer carry its burden by
objective evidence. In a mixed-motives case, where the legitimate motive found would have been ample grounds for the action taken, and
the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken
for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof.
Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring). The dissent stated that the Court should have adhered to the McDonnellDouglasscheme for proving discrimination, instead of creating
a new evidentiary framework for proving discrimination in a mixed-motive case. Id. at
287 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, the Eleventh Circuit explained that when an employee
introduces direct evidence alleging discriminatory motive, the McDonnell Douglas requirements are altered. Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (1 1th Cir. 1990)
(citing Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1539 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989)). Instead, the
court asserted, the employer must show that it would have reached the same decision
even without the discriminatory motive. Id. The court then clarified that "[a]lthough
the question of whether a plaintiff has presented direct evidence is not always entirely
clear, direct evidence relates to actions or statements of an employer reflecting a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation
complained of by the employee." Id. at 1555 (citations omitted).
65 See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 342.
66 944 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1991).
67 Id. at 282; see also Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991)
("Even assuming the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext suffices to
raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, this does not automatically entitle the
plaintiff to judgment.").
68 Galbraith,994 F.2d at 276. Sherry Galbraith, a white woman, began datingJames
Hunter, a black man, in 1984. Id. at 276, 277. In 1985, Hunter was given emergency
personal leave subject to the company's leave policy. Id. at 277. On one of the days
that Hunter was absent, Northern Telecom evacuated its employees due to a bomb
threat. Id. While Galbraith was sitting in her car after the evacuation, an individual
drove by and fired five bullets into the car, striking Galbraith. Id. Some speculated
that Hunter shot Galbraith, who was hospitalized as a result of her injuries. Id. at 27778, 278. Northern Telecom granted Galbraith medical leave. Id. at 278. When Galbraith returned to work, she was told that she violated the company's leave policy by
taking three accumulated personal days after the medical leave. Id. at 278-79. Galbraith was subsequently discharged, and she claimed that her employer treated her
differently than others in similar situations because of her interracial relationship. Id.
at 279.
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reasons given by the employer for Galbraith's dismissal were
pretextual.69 The court clarified, however, that although Galbraith
was able to show that the employer's reasons were untrue, she was
unable to demonstrate that the actions constituted a pretext for
discrimination.7" Thus, the court held that Galbraith was not the
71
victim of intentional discrimination.
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit applied a "pretext only" rule in
Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville Railroad.7 2 In Thornbrough, the
plaintiff brought a claim against his employer for violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which uses the same standard as Title VII cases. 73 The Thornbroughcourt held that summary
69 Id. at 282. The court professed that Northern Telecom's explanation that Galbraith had violated the medical leave policy was not the company's true motive. Id.
Rather, the court explained, "[t]he policy Galbraith allegedly violated shows every
sign of being an ad hoc fabrication." Id. In fact, the court found "compelling" the
magistrate's findings as to the real reasons behind the dismissal: namely, that Northern Telecom actually dismissed Galbraith because she refused to press charges against
Hunter, and because Galbraith's continued relationship with Hunter could pose a
threat to the company. Id. at 283.
70 Id. at 282. The Galbraith court noted that some courts allow the employee to
prevail upon demonstrating that the employer's explanation for the adverse treatment was pretextual. Id. The court emphatically noted that such an analysis "misapprehends the nature of the McDonnell Douglas doctrine." Id. Rather, the Galbraith
court clarified that "[i]n the third phase of the McDonnell Douglas framework, she
must persuade the trier of fact that the proffered reason was pretextual, but this burden is simply a way of bearing her ultimate burden of showing that she has been the
victim of intentional discrimination." Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
71 Id. at 283. The Sixth Circuit, however, has applied both the pretext-plus rule
and the pretext-only rule. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 73 n.49. For example, only four
years prior to Galbraith,a Sixth Circuit panel decided a similar case quite differently.
See Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1987). In Tye, a female guidance
counselor brought a Title VII claim against the Board of Education after her contract
was not renewed. Id. at 316-17. Although the district court found that the reasons
articulated by the employer were not pretextual, the court of appeals announced that
there was, in fact, pretext. Id. at 320. Because the guidance counselor proved pretext, the appellate court ruled that she should prevail. Id. at 320-21.
72 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985); see Lanctot, supra note 5, at 72 n.48.
73 Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 638 & n.4. See supra note 2 for a description of the
ADEA and other cases that have used the McDonnell Douglas framework.
In Thornbrough, the Columbus & Greenville Railroad Company, which had been
experiencing grave financial difficulties, furloughed Maud Lee Thornbrough as part
of a reduction in the overall work force. Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 637. Thornbrough
had 31 years of railroad experience and was 56 years old at the time of his discharge.
Id. Thornbrough's job was eliminated and his responsibilities divided among four
younger individuals at the company. Id. Moreover, the company retained several
younger employees in positions comparable to Thornbrough's, in addition to hiring
two new employees with minimal railroad experience. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that
Thornbrough's allegations against the company, although somewhat limited, were
enough to support his prima facie case. Id. at 643. The court articulated that because
this was a reduction in force case, the prima facie case differed slightly, but was still
within the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Id. at 644.
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judgment was improper because there was a genuine issue of fact
concerning whether the employer's proffered reasons for the employment action were pretextual.7 ' The court explained that if the
employee was able to demonstrate that the articulated reasons
were pretextual, the plaintiff could recreate the presumption of
discrimination that existed in the plaintiff's prima facie case.75
Against this backdrop of inconsistent application of the McDonnell Douglas rule, the Court established the proper standard to
76
be applied in a Title VII case in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.
The Hicks Court held that a finding of pretext does not automatically entitle the employee to judgment, and that the employee
must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in intentional
discrimination.7 7
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 78 first enunciated that
once the defendant has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment action, there is no credibility assessment and any
74 Id. at 646. Additionally, the court clarified that Thornbrough need not prove
that the railroad's motivation was "bad"; rather, "he need only persuade the factfinder
that the Railroad's purported good reasons were untrue." Id. at 647 (citation
omitted).
75 Id. at 639-40. The court discerned that if on remand the factfinder concluded
that Thornbrough was more qualified than other employees who were retained, the
employer's reasons could be considered pretextual. Id. at 647. The court declared
that "[g]iven the difficulties of demonstrating age discrimination, we believe that the
better course is to allow the factfinder to determine whether the plaintiffs evidence
justifies an inference of age discrimination." Id.
76 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749-50 (1993). Justice Scalia's decision in Hicks was foreshadowed by the Justice's dissenting opinion in Carterv. Duncan-Huggins,Ltd.. See Carter v.
Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Lanctot, supra note 5, at 96-98. In Cater,Geraldine Carter, a black woman, brought a
§ 1981 claim against her employer alleging that her employer treated her differently
and compensated her less than other employees. See id. at 1228-29. A jury awarded
Carter damages, and the district court refused to grant the employer ajudgment non
obstante verdicto. Id. at 1227. Affirming the decision of the trial court, the D.C.
Circuit held that the record below supported a finding of racial discrimination. Id. at
1232-33.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Scalia contended that
[t]he majority's fallacy lies in using the word "discrimination" as a synonym for "discrimination on the basis of race." Such usage may suffice in
common parlance, but for purposes of analyzing the proof in a § 1981
suit it is, if I may not be misunderstood in so expressing it, too
undiscriminating.
Id. at 1247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Responding to Scalia's insistence on proving discrimination through direct evidence, the majority stated that such an imposition is without precedent and would
"effectively eviscerate section 1981." Id. at 1232.
77 Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.
78 Chief Justice Rehnquist and justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined
Justice Scalia in the majority opinion. Id. at 2745.
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presumption on behalf of the plaintiff is effectively rebutted. 79
The Court accepted that an employee may create an inference of
discrimination by establishing a prima facie case and discrediting
the employer's reasons for dismissal.8" The Court cautioned, however, that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion and
a mere presumption in a plaintiff's favor will not shift the burden
of proof.8 ' In fact, the Court stressed that it did not have the authority to hold the employer liable for employment discrimination
without a finding that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee, as that would be a lesser standard.8 2 The
majority then turned to Burdine to support its proposition that the
plaintiff still ultimately carried the burden of proving that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee, regardless
of a determination that the employer's reasons were pretextual.8 3
Justice Scalia sharply criticized the dissent.8 4 First, the Justice
disagreed with the dissent's characterization of Burdine and the dis79

Id. at 2748, 2749..

80 Id. at 2749. The Court disagreed with the appellate court's determination that a

rejection of the employer's reasons for dismissal compels a judgment for the plaintiff.
Id. The Court stated that "the fundamental principle" of Rule 301 dictates that a
presumption shall not shift the burden of proof. Id. Rule 301 provides in pertinent
part:
Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings
In all civil actions ...

a presumption imposes on the party against

whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof

in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout
the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EVID. 301 (emphasis added).
81 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
82 Id. at 2751. The Court suggested that the dissent would allow a lesser standard
of overall proof than that required in employment discrimination cases. Id. Justice
Scalia asserted that such a standard had no basis in the law. Id. Essentially, the majority contended that no legal basis existed for allowing an employee to prevail upon a
showing that the employer's explanations were pretextual. See id. The Court elaborated that the only way such a scheme would be lawful was if the plaintiff's degree of
proof in the prima facie case was very high. Id. Justice Scalia maintained that this
would amount to the standard required for a directed verdict. Id. The majority stated
that the only support for the dissent's analysis of the law could be found in dicta of
Supreme Court decisions and not in Title VII itself. Id.
83 Id. at 2751-53. In addition to disagreeing with the dissent's ultimate analysis of
Burdine, the Court differed with the dissent's reliance on one particular sentence in
Burdine to support its proposition that the plaintiff did not carry the burden of proving discriminatory intent. Id. at 2752. The majority emphatically stated that "[iut is to
those [court opinions] that we now turn-begrudgingly, since we think it generally
undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of
the United States Reports as though they were the United States Code." Id. at 2751.
See infra note 85 for the sentence over which the dissent and the majority disagreed.
84 See Hicks, 113 S. Ct at 2751-56.
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sent's reliance on a particular sentence8 5 in Burdine to support the
minority's contention that a finding of pretext alone is enough to
prevail on a disparate treatment claim. 6 Ultimately, the majority
called this sentence upon which the dissent heavily relied dictuma 7
Also, Justice Scalia addressed the dissent's contention that the majority's holding essentially encourages an employer to give a false
reason for the employment action to rebut the presumption
against him. 8 The Court admitted that some employers would undoubtedly lie about the reasons for dismissing or terminating an
employee.8 9 The Court propounded, however, thatjust because an
employer may lie does not mean that the employee is entitled to a
Title VIIjudgment, as Title VII is not meant to be a cause of action
for perjury.90 Furthermore, the Hicks Court professed that even
though the reason proffered by the employer is unpersuasive, or
85 The sentence in Burdine over which the majority and the dissent disagreed concerned the actions the plaintiff must take once the defendant has rebutted the presumption of discriminatory intent. See id. at 2752. It follows in context:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this eitherdirectly by persuading the court that a discriminatoiy reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)) (emphasis added).
86 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
87 Id. The majority called the disputed sentence in Burdine "simply incompatible"
with the rest of the language in the case. Id. at 2751. The Court also challenged the
dissent's characterization of the burden that the plaintiff faces after showing that the
proffered reason was untrue. Id. at 2752. The majority criticized the dissent's understanding that "'the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the
victim of intentional discrimination' is replaced by the mere burden of 'demonstrat[ing] that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.'" Id. The Court asserted that such a characterization was one "in which the little
fish swallows the big one." Id. The majority claimed that an employee must show both
that the employer's reason was untrue and that discrimination was the actual motivation. Id. The Court then remarked that its interpretation was consistent with Aikens,
in which the ultimate question to be determined was discrimination vel non. Id. at
2753 (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714
(1983)). See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text for an analysis of Aikens.
88 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754.
89 Id. The majority exclaimed that "[ulndoubtedly some employers (or at least
their employees) will be lying." Id.
90 Id. The Court remarked that the defendant in a Title VII case is usually not an
individual but rather a company. Id. Thus, the Court explained, the company must
rely upon the testimony of one of its employees to demonstrate its reason for the
adverse employment action. Id. The majority propounded, however, that "[tio say
that the company which in good faith introduces such testimony, or even the testify-
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even contrived, it does not mean that the plaintiff was terminated
because of his or her race. 9 1
In dissent,9 Justice Souter observed that the McDonnell Douglas
presumption was formed to reconcile two competing policy interests: 1) the employer's interest in giving nondiscriminatory explanations for termination of the employee, and 2) the employee's
difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of discrimination. 9 3 Justice
Souter characterized Burdine and other case law as allowing the
plaintiff to meet the burden of persuasion either directly or indirectly.9 4 The dissent explained that an employee can either persuade the court directly by showing that the employer had
discriminatory motives or indirectly by showing that the proffered
reasons by the employer were untrue, or pretextual. 9 5 While recognizing that the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving discrimination, the dissent perceived prior case law as providing
ing employee himself, becomes a liar and a perjurer when the testimony is not believed, is nothing short of absurd." Id.
91 Id. at 2756. The Court explained that the factfinder must discern, subject to
appellate review, whether race was the actual motivation. Id.
92 Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Souter's dissent. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent articulated that once the employer meets its burden of production by introducing legitimate reasons for its employment action, the presumption entitling the employee to judgment does, in fact,
drop from the case. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, Justice Souter
contended, the employer plays an important role in articulating these reasons clearly,
so that the employee has a fair opportunity to prove pretext. Id. With the majority's
decision, the dissent argued, an employer will have no incentive to clearly articulate
an explanation of the adverse employment action. Id.
Additionally, the dissent claimed that although the presumption drops from the
case, the plaintiffs prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination that can be
used to demonstrate pretext. Id. at 2762 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted
that this inference is only strengthened by the employee's presentation of additional
evidence, because "'common experience' tells us that is 'more likely than not' that
the employer who lies is simply trying to cover up the illegality alleged by the plaintiff." Id. at 2762-63 (Souter,J., dissenting) (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
94 Id. at 2760 (Souter,J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent strongly criticized the majority's contention that a plaintiff should prove both that the reasons
articulated are pretextual and intentional discrimination. Id. at 2759-61 nn.5-8 (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissent noted:
The majority thus takes a shorthand phrase from Burdine ("pretext for
discrimination"), discovers requirements in the phrase that are directly
at odds with the specific requirements actually set out in Burdine, and
then rewrites Burdine in light of this "discovery." No one "[flamiliar
with our case law," . . . will be persuaded by this strategy.
Id. at 2760 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
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alternative means to demonstrate this discriminatory intent because of plaintiffs' difficulty in finding direct evidence of discrimi96
natory intent.
Justice Souter anticipated that the majority's actions in Hicks
would frustrate the legislative purpose of Title VII by making it unfair and impractical for an employee to bring suit against his employer.9 7 Moreover, the dissent claimed that the majority's scheme
would reward employers that lie in disparate treatment actions. 98
Finally, Justice Souter criticized the majority's holding for being
contrary to twenty years of prior case law and the legal doctrine of
stare decisis.99
In Hicks, Justice Scalia created an unworkable standard that
will only serve to confuse parties and courts forced to conform to
the Supreme Court's decision. 0 0 Arguably, a plaintiff could still
win his or her case by proving that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual. The plaintiff's proof of pretext, along with the
prima facie case, could be enough to allow the plaintiff to win. As
Justice Scalia explained, however, nothing "compels" a court to
find for the plaintiff as a matter of law upon finding pretext. 0
Rather, as the Hicks Court pronounced, the plaintiff at all times
bears the burden of persuasion to prove that the employer inten96 Id. at 2761-62 (Souter, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 2763 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice Souter warned that Congress was free
to alter the Court's holding. Id. at 2765 (Souter,J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
The dissent observed that
[i]
t is not as though Congress is unaware of our decisions concerning
Title VII, and recent experience indicates that Congress is ready to act if
we adopt interpretations of this statutory scheme it finds to be mistaken.... Congress has taken no action to indicate that we were mistaken in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.
Id. at 2765-66 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
98 Id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter chided: "[t]he majority's
scheme therefore leads to the perverse result that employers who fail to discover nondiscriminatory reasons for their own decisions to hire and fire employees not only will
benefit from lying, but must lie, to defend successfully against a disparate-treatment
action." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
99 Id. at 2764, 2765 (Souter,J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that its reading of
Burdineand prior case law was consistent with the view espoused by the United States
Solicitor General and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at 2765
(Souter,J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Souter noted that over half of the federal
circuits had addressed the issue, although some in dicta. Id. With this in mind, the
dissent questioned why the majority departed from McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,
which provided a "clear answer" to the issue before the Court. Id.
100 SeeAnthony LimitoneJr., Living with Hicks, 17 N.J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.Q. 15,
15 (Winter 1994) ("Before Hicks, the playing field was relatively level with well marked
boundaries and clear rules. Not any more. Now the field is titled against plaintiffs;
there are no boundaries; and the rules are unclear.").
101 See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
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tionally discriminated against the plaintiff.10 2
Although the majority implied that proving pretext may sometimes be enough to show intentional discrimination, it seems more
likely that employees will have to show more than mere pretext in
order to win their case. Only future case law will allow plaintiffs to
0 3
discern what they must show in addition to pretext.
Before Hicks, certainly some employers would give false reasons for terminating or demoting an employee. The majority's
holding in Hicks, however, creates an even greater incentive for the
employer to furnish an untrue reason for the dismissal of an employee. The employer has nothing to lose by giving this false rea04
son, as the plaintiff must still demonstrate discriminatory motive.'
Hicks will deter plaintiffs from bringing employment discrimination cases because of the uncertainty of the standard of proof
required. It is certain, however, that the post-Hicks employee must
conform to a higher standard of proof to show intentional discrimination. Justice Scalia, in one fell swoop, has lessened the effectiveness of disparate treatment claims under Title VII, and made it
more difficult for a plaintiff to prove his or her case under the
established McDonnell Douglas framework.'0 5
In response to this unfair, unworkable, and impractical decision, on November 22, 1993, Senate Labor Subcommittee ChairId.
Some argue that the application of Hicks essentially requires the person complaining of discrimination to establish direct evidence of intent. Leading Cases, supra
note 10, at 348. Plaintiffs will rarely have evidence of such intent, as it usually exists
only in the employer's mind. Id. at 349.
104 One commentator reported:
The result of the decision, of course, is that even if a defendant in a
discriminatory treatment suit blatantly lies about the reason for the
challenged action, the plaintiff must still go through the extremely difficult task of proving a discriminatory motive. Indeed, the decision puts a
premium on lying, for it is settled law that if the defendant is silent, the
plaintiff wins.
Herman Schwartz, U.S. Supreme Court Year in Review: The Court's Right Is Still Mighty,
N.J.L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at 5 (Supp). Schwartz also noted that Hicks was "perhaps the
most intellectually dubious" of the Supreme Court's decisions for the term. Id.
105 See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 348 ("The application of Rule 301 to the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdineframework will severely curtail the ability of many Title VII
plaintiffs to succeed on their disparate treatment claims.").
A California court commented that Hicks could have a serious unintended effect
on the defendant employer's case. Moisi v. College of the Sequoias Community College Dist., No. F017075, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 1030, at *18-*19 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14,
1993). The court recognized that Hicks would "preclude summary judgment in most
employment discrimination cases, at least in those where the employee has established a prima facie case and there are no legal defenses . . .available to the employer." Id.
102
103
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man Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) introduced the proposed
Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act. 10 6 This proposed legislation would explicitly overrule Hicks and restore Title VII cases to
the pretext-only rule.1 07 Under the proposed legislation, Title VII
plaintiffs could demonstrate intentional discrimination by proving
their prima facie case and showing that the employer's reason for
the employment action is pretextual.10 8 The legislation, therefore,
relieves the employee of proving that the employer's reason was
untrue because of a discriminatory motive." 9
The arrival of newcomer Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is unlikely to have any impact on the issue of proper burden allocations
in disparate treatment cases. Although Justice Ginsburg is definitely more sympathetic to the pretext-only rule 1 0 espoused in the
The relevant portion of the Bill reads:
SEc. 1979A. STANDARDS FOR PROVING INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
(a) STANDARDS.-In a case or proceeding brought under Federal
law in which a complaining party meets its burden of proving a prima
facie case of unlawful intentional discrimination and the respondent
meets its burden of clearly and specifically articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for the conduct at issue through the introduction of admissible evidence, unlawful intentional discrimination
shall be established where the complaining party persuades a trier of
fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that(1) a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the respondent;
or
(2) the respondent's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.
(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-This section shall apply only to
those cases and proceedings in which the method of proof articulated
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), applies and shall not be construed to specify the exclusive means by which
the complaining party may establish unlawful intentional discrimination
under Federal law.
139 CONG. REc. S16948, S16950 (Nov. 22, 1993).
107 Congress Moves to Overturn Hicks Ruling, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 235, at A-16
(Dec. 9, 1993). Representative Major Owens (D-NY) introduced a companion bill to
Metzenbaum's in the House of Representatives (H-3680). Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission supports legislation overturning the Supreme Court's
decision in Hicks. Id.
106

108 Id.
109 See id.
110 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg sat on the D.C. Circuit panel in several discrimina-

tion cases. See, e.g., Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Harding
court enunciated the burden allocation scheme to be followed in the case, espousing
the "pretext-only" rule for inferring discriminatory intent. Id. at 152. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg sat on the D.C. Circuit panel in Whitacre v. Davey. See Whitacre v. Davey,
890 F.2d 1168, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Whitacre also enunciated "pretext-only" as controlling law. Id. at 1170; see also Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 82, 87 (D.C. Cir.
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Hicks dissent, Justice Ginsburg is replacing Justice White,'
however,
It
is
conceivable,
Hicks.
in
minority
was a member of the
that Justice Stephen Breyer, who replaces Justice Blackmun, 1 '2
would have voted with the majority in Hicks and not automatically
allowed the plaintiff to prevail upon a showing of pretext. ' 3 Judging from the predispositions of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, even
if the Court heard another case regarding this issue,"1 4 it is unlikely
that Hicks would be overruled.
Susan J. Schleck

1985) (opinion by then-Judge Ginsburg in which the burdens are analyzed); Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 60, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (opinion by
then-Judge Ginsburg using Burdine framework in Title VII case).
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg assisted in the representation of the American
Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae in a number of Title VII cases. See Regents of
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 268 (1978) (Justice Ginsburg writing amicus curiae brief for American Civil Liberties Union); City of Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978) (same); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 323 (1977) (same); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 739
(1976) (same); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 486 (1974) (same).
111 And Now There Are 2: Justice Ginsburg Is Seated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1993, at 9.
112 Justice Breyer Is Sworn in, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at 14.
113 Justice Breyer was on a First Circuit Court of Appeals panel on a case concerning discrimination under the ADEA. See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
896 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). In Medina-Munoz, the court enunciated the "pretextplus" rule, stating that the employer had to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment action. Id. at 9. The court stated that the plaintiff must then show
that the proffered reason "was but a pretext for age discrimination." Id. (quotation
and citations omitted). In order to do this, the court noted, an employee must do
more than just show pretext, as "[t]he plaintiff must also show a discriminatory animus based on age." Id. (citations omitted). The court stated:
it remains true that when, as here, the employer has articulated a presumptively legitimate reason for discharging an employee, the latter
must elucidate specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the
reason given was not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the
employer's real motive: age discrimination.
Id. at 9.
114 In fact, in January, 1994, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for a case in
which one of the questions presented was whether there was a need to clarify the
Hicks standard. Fisher v. Rutgers, State Univ., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at E-3
(Jan. 11, 1994); 114 S. Ct. 686, 687 (1994).

